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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Man, from his first artifacts to the present time, established and developed reflection, 
that is to say, the aptitude to interpret symbolically the material reality of the 
surrounding world. As hominids emerged in evolution at the time of the Neanderthals, 
drawings and tools show a progressive maturation of technical intelligence that is 
probably parallel to the evolution of language. 
An elementary property of language consists of creating, in parallel to the outer world, 
an all-powerful world of symbols without which intelligence would be deprived of an 
essential tool. Religious thinking had to follow the same course; the symbols formulated 
in words and actions reflect the feelings of fear and dominion that marks religious 
conscience. It seems extraordinary that we share a conception of the supernatural across 
time, though not in the sense in that we conceived it some millennia ago.  Some 
millennia of rationalism have allowed western culture to refine ways to conceive the 
universal order, by means of mysticism, magic, dogma, law, philosophy, science, 
technique. In the conditions of paleolíthical man, the anxiety to understand  both well 
known   unknown mysterious things were expressed in a belief system, that was 
different, but with its own system of reasons just as complex as the reasoning in Greek 
philosophy or Quantum Mechanics.  This system was the key, for primitive man, for 
having security, in the lands of life and death.   
Sensations perceived by man reflect a world without meaning, but due to his psychic 
system, he transforms them into significant and tactile objects.  Man uses such objects 
to solve first his survival problems, and soon this cognitive activity led to the 
transcendental sense of his person. Signals arrive from the senses or memory, and are 
transformed like images being manipulated by abstract or associative cognitive routes. 
An abstract route is a mechanism that allows concept formation, whereas the associative 
route structures the representations by similarity, contiguity or contrasts. These 
phenomena take place in what we call a representational space that is a type of mental 
screen where images are projected and maintained by the senses, memory or 
imagination. Due to the connections between the world of the objects and the 
consciousness, we can communicate providing visual images. What we call an image 
may be an internal or external representation, of sensations structured by the conscience.   
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The natural "embodiment" of the perceived spatial relations is culturally encoded and 
thereby leads to a kind of iconic link between perception, language, and the perceived 
world. However, the codes representing space are not merely images of the surrounding 
world but instructions concerning its individual and social construction. 
We can define the existential space as a relatively stable system of images of the 
surrounding world of the man, and that it indicates that this surrounding space is a 
necessary part of the existential structure.  A complete theory of the existential space 
must include abstract and concrete aspects: 
 
1) The abstract aspects refer to general schemes of topological and geometric 
classes.   
2) The concrete aspects refer to the physical environment, buildings, urban and 
rural landscapes.   
 
Associated with the elementary properties of the existential space are the concepts of 
center and place, because man spontaneously acts in spaces.  As opposed to the center, 
the place indicates certain dimension, but it is necessary to distinguish between one’s 
own place, that is the space that each organism protests like own, and the abstract image 
of well-known places. The existential space is therefore, a psychological concept, 
determined by the structure of the environment and the psychic character of the man.  
 
Definition 1: Materialization is the conversion by means of certain mathematical 
correspondences of an abstract set whose elements are beliefs or ideas, in an impure set 
whose elements are material or energetic.   
 
In the materialization process, we will distinguish two different although intimately 
united processes:  symbolic materialization and textual materialization. We will divide 
the Primigenial Base into two parts, PB1 containing the archetypes and PB2 containing 
myths (Figure 1).   
 
In order to establish patterns of materialization of the beliefs we are going to consider 
that these have defined mathematical structures.  It will allow us to understand better the 
processes of textual, architectural, normative, educative, etc., materialization, of an 
ideology and we propose the following initial hypotheses (Usó-Doménech and 
Nescolarde-Selva.2012; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013c): 
 
Hypothesis 1: The beliefs are not the product of reason or of abstract and logical 
thought.   
 
Hypothesis 2: In the origin of any belief system there is always a mythical system of 
beliefs.   
 
Myths are not designed as analytical presentations of the kinds of social factors most 
likely to ensure a reasonable balance between individual liberty and supraindividual 
order. Neither are myths about the kinds of cultural circumstances that could lead to 
social upheaval and arbitrary abuse of power, or to a calcified order that benefits only 
the few. In mythical accounts, often there is conflict between good and evil – either 
freedom versus constraint or order versus chaos. 
3 
 
Ideological Doxical 
Superstructure 
 (IDS) 
Values in fact, Dominant Ideology, 
Primigenial Base 
PB1: Archetypes 
PB2: Ideal Values, Myths.
connotative-SB- projection 
(symbolic materialization)
Subject
mythical superstructural 
image (MS-image)
Ideal Structure (ISt) 
  
Ideal Values, abstract ideology 
Utopia (Goals)
doxical superstructural 
image (IDS-image). 
Mythical Superstructure (MS)
last goal
near goal
inverse-MS-image
inverse-MS-projection (concretion)
ACTUAL
IDEAL
Actual Structural Base 
Desirable Structural 
Base
3
connotative-SB- projection 
(textual materialization)
Figure 1: The two different processes of materialization:  symbolic and textual 
materialization. 
  
The notion that all we have to do is fight for freedom is closely linked to the belief that 
human beings are inherently good and that, given half a chance, they will behave with 
integrity. The notion that morality depends on a certain cultural order stems largely 
from the belief that human beings are egotistical and anarchistic, that they can behave 
decently only within a civil or religious framework. Faith in the noble savage can be 
regarded as a counter-faith to the doctrine of original sin. 
 
2. TEXTUAL MATERIALIZATION 
 
There is a textual space that is a materialization of the existential space. The textual 
space is also, a legacy that constrains the individual, is therefore prior to him since it 
reflects the existential spaces of his predecessors.  And within this textual space we will 
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distinguish between the written textual space and the architectural spaces, the pictorial, 
etc. A special and very important case is the textual space of written texts.   
Structurally, natural human conversation is an acoustic phenomenon without spatial 
extension: it is structured as a sequence in time. However, its product is the written 
text, which is referred to very often in terms of spatial metaphors. Therefore, in the 
phonetic chain only in terms of time, a spatial dimension is attributed to the linearity of 
signs : the geometry of the line. This is what Nöth (1994) calls a semiotic paradox, and 
he compiles an amazing number of examples for the linguistic expression of what he 
calls the geometry and topology of textual space. Nöth finds them especially in 
metaphors: 
 
1) First dimension: the literal meaning of which refers to spatial structures as in 
points or lines.  
 
2) Second dimension: metatextual topoi1 of space, levels, or surface structures.  
 
3) Third dimension: an intratextual or intertextual reference, bodily topoi, or 
metatextual organization of units such as chapters, etc.  
It may suggest a static concept of written textual space, but there are many examples of 
a dynamic spatial concept as well e.g., changes of (textual) space, movement within 
(textual) space, its limits and extension, and, of course, all the linguistic means of 
deictic reference. Indeed, cognitive semantics has attempted to explain the remarkable 
frequency of spatial metaphor in everyday language by the biological relevance of how 
humans perceive space and orient themselves within it in phases of prelinguistic 
language acquisition (Lakoff, 1987). All these findings open up a new perspective on 
the Saussurian notion of textual linearity. There is a focus on semiotic relationships 
between cognitive categorization of space and its textual representation in various sign 
systems (i.e. texts not only in the syntactical understanding of linguistics). Focusing on 
the problem of how to represent the complexity of three-dimensional space in the 
linearity of one-dimensional sign sequences (e.g., sentences), Wenz (1997) suggests that 
texts may develop their own (metaphorical) notion of space within which the reader will 
find his/her orientation during the process of reading. In other words, it is the reader 
who constructs 'textual space' based on interpretation of sign sequences functioning as a 
semiotic Gestalt. If we understand the linearity of texts as a projection of semiotic 
principles structured on a kind of ordo naturalis of language, we may logically also 
argue for a cultural convention or social order of space designed through texts: it is a 
matter of categorizing perception through shared knowledge, or, as Lakoff (1987) put it, 
seeing always means "seeing as". Everything in a text (T) looks for an equilibrium. 
There is a conscience of imbalance and a will of balance. Human groups (SB) operate 
by answers, and logically, T also does. That is to say, they respond before the perceived 
reality. But this perception is not the one of a harmonious reality, but a nontotalized 
reality. And this no-totalization of the reality is the one that mediatizes and determines 
the collective answers. Consciousness of the imbalance, of the not-totality, in its 
equilibrium seeking will respond of three different ways:   
 
1) Prioritizing the equilibrium that is harmony (classic materialization).  It is 
characterized by negation of the imbalance, in one first analysis, although in fact 
it does not happen in this way.  Classic T is able to integrate itself, to balance all 
                                                 
1
 TheTopoi are patterns of thought and expression and preset, rhetorical archetypes for persuasion, classic 
origin. 
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negation and imbalance. Its world vision perceives ruptures as provisional and 
one makes an effort to indicate the way of integration.   
 
2) Prioritizing the perceived nonbalance (revolutionary materialization). This is the 
ruptural T. Ruptures are prioritized, breaking the styles and new forms are 
sought because previously the impossibility of satisfaction was acquired, 
inherited, integrated and part of the cultural balance. In these Ts, the newly 
obtained totalization is less rich and coherent than classic Ts. Nevertheless, from 
them arise the revolutions that allow dramatic leaps forward.  
 
3) Denying all balance (playful materialization). It is the utopic conception, the 
mythical celebration of reality that may be playful and perhaps involve song. 
The playful thing, to exist, would not need any type of symbol, since it would 
perpetuate itself easily.  
 
Through these three types of belief answers, any text (T) has to materialize itself with a 
certain equilibrium. Therefore, the Texts are the materialization of a peculiar world 
vision, a peculiar belief system and a peculiar ideology. They are simultaneously, its 
triumphant expression, its conservation, its transmission and its desire for eternity. In 
principle, a collective subject world vision generates its T’s problematic, mediating, 
inspiring and producing, but these mediations find a series of resistance: in content and 
form. Logically, a new world vision has to transform the inherited belief structures, 
ways of doing, behaviors, forms and contents. These mediations have to take place most 
of the times with damage to the T in their total unit, affecting even their coherence. 
When the world vision changes, the text accomplish a mission for which it had been 
conceived, and is left, forgotten and sometimes even destroyed, often with unusual 
violence, when a certain world vision has been replaced by another one with radically 
opposed substantive beliefs. Whole libraries have been burned, as they were considered 
heretical or blasphemous. Sanctuaries were destroyed or reused with a change in 
function. Old Gods were interpreted as demons or reused as new Gods (or saints). 
Forgetfulness is perhaps the kindest result after such a change. History has a multitude 
of examples.  In this paper, we tried to give a logical and mathematical explanation to 
the materialization of a belief system through the mathematical structures that appear, as 
much in the belief system as in the text.  For this we must formulate own previous 
concepts of our Text Theory (Usó-Domènech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012). 
   
Let WV be a determined world vision, T be a text and SA, SB be the author and reader 
respectively. 
 
Definition 2: The content c of T is the materialization of a series of social relations 
produced in SB that take shape in a determined WV, and that uses previous 
materializations, considered historical, and produced in previous SB and within same 
culture C.  
 
Definition 3: The form f is the materialization of a determined and specific WV.   
 
The form f is a creation or social product that can appear at the same time as c. 
Nevertheless, we know by historical experience that f can take long periods of time 
(years and even centuries) in reaching a constant and unremovable structure. 
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Consequence 1: A content c of T is in relation to an inherited form ft-1, constructed in 
advance of the materialization of c.  
 
Consequence 2: Content c of T must find a form f to materialize itself, and that is 
preexisting to the c to which it is to materialize. 
 
In according Ferreras (1980) a classification of forms f with respect to contents can be 
established:   
 
1) Adapted forms:  f offers minimum resistance to the materialization of c.   
 
2) Inadequate forms: f offers maximum resistance to the materialization of c.   
 
3. STRUCTURES OF MATERIALIZATION 
 
In any text T we distinguish between the Structuring Structure (SS) and the Structured 
Structure (sS) of all text.  
 
Definition 4: The Structuring Structure (SS) of T is the internal cause by means of 
which the different elements summoned in T are structured or organised.   
 
1) SS is the self-regulating cause of the structure, since it is the source of the 
exclusion principle.   
 
2) SS is bound deeply with ways of doing, thinking, and feeling in a T, with a 
determined WV.   
 
3) This WV, or a collective, belonging to SB, generates a collective subject that 
materializes T.  
  
4) In SS also are the organizational causes, or the self-regulating virtuality and the 
organizational virtuality, but these virtualities refer to a way of doing, not to 
content.  
 
5) SS also is deeply bound with the WV of a social group.   
 
6) In the concrete level of the structure of T, SS is its central core, the reason to be.   
 
Consequence 3: There is a continuous movement by which the information coming 
from Structural Base (SB) modifies codes and ideologies and it is translated into new 
codes and ideologies.   
 
SS comes from a collective or transpersonal subject, but this SS develops now, by 
means of an individual and specific action, with one sS that will be the form.  
 
Definition 5: A structured Structure (sS) is the concrete materialization in SB of a 
Structuring Structure (SS).   
  
A book, a church, a castle, a picture, a symphony, etc is determined by sS. A Structured 
Structure (sS) has the following characteristics: 
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1) A structuring or materialization of SS is a necessary condition for the T’s 
existence.   
 
2) sS has its own mediations.  SS does not take automatically shape sS, but sS can 
even mediate its own SS, modifying it, by means of a feedback process.   
 
3) sS is the primary connoted significance. SS "will be covered" by sS, like a 
secondary connoted significance.   
 
The existence of both structures of T:  SS and sS, have two characteristics:  
 
1) These characteristics explain T in its relation with SB (subject group).  The 
collective subject is the creator of the SS but not necessarily the producer of sS.  
The mediations of the SA are decisive.  Between content c of T and SA there is 
an intimate connection.  The "world of T" is the inner world of the SA.   
 
2) These characteristics allow valuing the internal coherence of T.  
 
SS is the true motor and cause of T and comes from a collective or transpersonal 
subject.  But this SS goes to face, by means of an individual and specific action with 
one sS to which we will denominate form. Therefore, the form f of a text T is the one 
structured structure sS of this text.  A form f, or sS, is a produced social creation in SB, 
that is previously in the collective conscience (belonging to DS), and when the moment 
arrives for expressing a new c, sS already has been accepted and used.  Nevertheless, sS 
is also a structure that has its own self-regulating internal laws that make it exist as f. 
While the new cs are not in contradiction with the internal laws of f, f will continue 
working as f. Nevertheless, by the law of historical evolution, f will be in opposition 
with the new cs. It will be necessary to consider not only the internal laws of SS that 
enters opposition, but also the existing differences between the new c and the old cs. 
The explanation has to be in the social evolution of SB, formed by groups and social 
classes that are those that construct f, use it and that at a certain moment, are incapable 
to use it without transforming or destroying it.   
 
Example 1: Consider a very well-known literary form, the novel.  The novel, as it 
forms an f or sS, it is a social form, one T, that has had its history, genesis and 
emergence. To find the social group, belonging to a certain historical SB, which created 
the novel, means, to know a mental structure, a way to think, to be related, to have 
values , a belief system, an ideology, and a peculiar WV. The form f = novel is of clear 
bourgeois origin. The Renaissance man was able to commit himself legally and 
economically and then the "modern man" emerged, and with him, the novel was born.  
This new man is a hero who lost his position in the great harmonious totality of an 
organized, totalized society and in the harmonic Cosmos, with a sense of the Divinity.  
It was a new SS that needed to materialize itself, and that when this happened it did so 
in a precise and specific way. The novel arose therefore, but as it is natural, these T 
could not emerge from anything; the Renaissance new man, had within the new field of 
his WV, two forms to consider:  on the one hand, the memory and the conserved 
examples of old, Greek and Roman novels, and on the other hand, the inheritance of 
closed poems and national epic poems.  And on these two inheritances, at least, the new 
novelist counted and operated. Cervantes evokes to Heliodoro and the cavalry books to 
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try to desacralize the closed, old world and to materialize for the first time, an 
individualized hero. The cavalry books represent the midpoint in which a form f resists 
being used with a new WV; for that reason closed novel forms2 are incapable of 
evolution. In the novel Amadís de Gaula (a popular Spanish cavalry book) the 
protagonist is already an individualized man, who is called Amadís, but his conduct fits 
a well-known table of values, that permits no evolution , and there is no way he can stop 
being the Amadís,. Form f = epic resists materializing the Renaissance subject in any 
way that is not representative or of any table of values that are nationally accepted. To 
materialize himself as a new person, he has to break with one of the structures or 
internal laws of forms f1 = epic or f2 = poem:  that in which the hero is a collective hero, 
and representative of a whole society. The new SS, of bourgeois origin, is 
individualistic, fights to prevail and to materialize itself in the form that it finds and that 
is led by the historical mediations of its moment and space.  Then it will transform this 
form f until turning it into the form which at the moment we know as a novel.   
*** 
 
We have made a brief scheme, that is not absolutely complete, since we could consider 
another series of reports (images and projections) that would make the scheme much 
more complicated. Nevertheless, there is no way to understand the emergence of a form 
(novel in example 1), if do not consider the adjustments and nonadjustments of a series 
of inherited forms just prior to the necessities of materialization of a new transpersonal 
conscience, that is to say, of a new SS.    
 
The sS is always necessary for the existence of the cultural unit, to avoid turningsS into 
a pure conceptualization. In addition, it is necessary that sS responds to a certain 
coherence, or a minimum of coherence that we would agree to establish. A rigorous 
analysis of SS of a textual structure, would also give a WV and the collective subject 
that mediates and inspires the analyzed T.  
 
Consequence 4: All SS is consubstantial to the collective subject of the textual structure 
(TS).   
 
The mediation of the author SA usually is important and significant, nevertheless, the sS, 
usually is used collectively but also collective formed and created. SA has to be related 
to sS by means of a personal style and of a way of doing. This the author’s 
psychological contexture.   
 
Consequence 5: According to what we have defined previously the Structured Structure 
sS is the materialization of a world vision WV, is to say is the text T itself. Then .sST ≡  
 
4. THE TOPOLOGICAL STRUCTURING STRUCTURE (SS) 
 
Let T be a text. In all text T, not concerning their material nature, certain elements exist 
(subtexts) containing their basic ideas. This subtext constitutes the Structuring Structure 
(SS). It is possible to form a subtext TSS ⊆  containing others subtexts 
{ }mSS τττ ,...,, 21= connoting the basic ideas of T. Topological structures are based on 
                                                 
2
 Closed novel form, is one where there is a necessary relationship between the parts and the whole, so 
that each episode acquires its meaning in relation to the whole novel, and that it is not able or add or 
remove parts without harming against organizational equilibrium. 
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Anderson (1987), Birkhoff (1967), Bourbaki (1972), Bryant (1985), Burris and 
Sankappanavar  (1981), Kelley (1955) ), Klüver (2011), Samsonovich et al, (2009), 
Schechter (1997) and Willard (1970).  
 
, Schechter (1997) and Willard (1970).  
 
Hypothesis 3: When belonging to Structural Base (SB), the Structuring Structure (SS) 
will be "material", that is to say, a visual somehow as much for the believing as for the 
nonbelieving subjects.  
 
Note 1: Being SS material then it will be a 3-dimensional Euclidean space R3.   
 
Let { }nSS τττ ,...,, 21=  be a set of structured substantive beliefs.  
 
Definition 6: The Structuring Structure SS is a subtext formed by subtexts connoting the 
ideas or basic theses denoted by SA. Then { }mSS τττ ,...,, 21= . 
 
Note 2: The subtext SS is defined as the Structuring Structure of all text T. 
 
The Structuring Structure SS forms a finite sequence of materialized substantive or 
derived beliefs (Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva.2012; Nescolarde-Selva and 
Usó-Doménech, 2013c).  
 
SS is a subset of Euclidean space R3. Let τ be a point of SS.  
 
Definition 7: τ is a point of closure of SS if every open ball centered at τ contains a 
point of SS, being able to be τ itself. 
 
R3 is a metric space with metric d, τ is a point of closure of SS if for every r > 0, there is 
a ν in SS such that the distance d(τ,ν) < r.  
 
Definition 8: The accumulation point is a point which is the limit of this sequence.  
 
As well as the set substantive beliefs there is one main belief, and SS does not have it. 
Its accumulation point will be different for each materialization, depending on the 
author (or authors) and on the world vision at the particular historical moment. What 
can be observed in  a belief analysis of any text, written or other type of materialization 
that exists, is a convergence towards an idea or certain belief.  This will be the 
accumulation point of text T.   
 
Let SS’ be a subset of SS. 
 
Definition 9: A structuring cover for SS’ is the collection of sets { } IiiSCSC ∈= such that 
SSSC i ⊂∀ and ∪
Ii
iSCSS
∈
⊂' .  
 
A subset SCSC ⊂'  is also a structuring cover of SS.  
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Definition 10: A structuring refinement ΡS of SC is a structuring cover of SS such that 
SCUSV ∈∃Ρ∈∀ , such that UV ⊂ . 
 
The neighborhood filter ( )τΦ for a point τ  is the collection of all neighborhoods for the 
pointτ . The neighborhood basis ( )τB  for a point τ  is a filter base of the neighborhood 
filter ( ) ( )ττ Φ⊂B  such that ( ) ( ) UBBBU ⊂∈∃Φ∈∀ ,, ττ . The corresponding 
neighborhood filter is ( ) ( ){ }ττ BBBU ∈⊃=Φ : . For each point τ  in SST there exists a 
sequence of open neighborhoods, U1, U2, … of τ  such that for any open neighborhood, 
of τ , there exists an integer, i, with Ui  contained in V. Therefore, SST is a first-
countable because each point has a countable neighborhood basis.  
 
Theorem 1: SS fulfills the Heine-Borel theorem; therefore SS is a compact space.  
 
Proof: 
 
1) SS is closed. Let τ  be an accumulation point of SS, then any finite collection C 
of open sets, such that each open set U in the collection C is disjoint from some 
neighborhood VU of τ , fails to be a structuring cover of SS. Indeed, the 
intersection of the finite family of sets VU is a neighborhood W of τ in R3, 
therefore W must contain a point η  in SS (because τ is an accumulation point of 
SS) and this SS∈η  is not covered by the family C – because every U in C is 
disjoint from VU, hence disjoint from W that containsη , so η  is not in U. If SS is 
compact but not closed, then it has an accumulation point τ  not in SS. Consider 
a collection C′ consisting of an open neighborhood N(η ) for each SS∈η , 
chosen small enough to not intersect some neighborhood Vη of τ . Then C′ is an 
open structuring cover of SS, but any finite subcollection of C′ has the form of C 
discussed previously, and thus cannot be an open structuring subcover of SS. 
This contradicts the compactness of SS. Hence, every accumulation point of SS 
is in SS, so SS is closed. 
2) SS is bounded. Consider the open balls centered upon a common point τ , with 
any radius r. This can cover any set, because all points in the set are some 
distance away from that pointτ . Any finite structuring subcover of this 
structruring cover must be bounded, because all balls in the structuring subcover 
are contained in the largest open ball within that structuring subcover. Therefore, 
any set covered by this structuring subcover must also be bounded. 
3) The closed subset SS’ of SS is compact. Let CSS’ be an open structuring cover of 
SS’. Then U = R3 \ SS’ is an open set and { }UCC SSSS ∪'=  is an open 
structuring cover of SS. Since SS is compact, then CSS has a finite subcover C’SS 
that also covers the smaller set SS’. Since U does not contain any point of SS’, 
the set SS’ is already covered by  SSSS CC '' ' = \{ }U  that is a finite subcollection 
of the original collection CSS’. It is thus possible to extract from any open 
structuring cover CSS’ of SS’ a finite structuring subcover. 
Then, if SS is closed and bounded, then it is compact.   
 
Let SSXSS  be the cartesian product of SS. The set ( ){ }2121 :, ττττ =∈=∆ SSXSS  is 
closed in the product topology of SSXSS .  
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Let { }nSS τττ ,...,, 21=  be a set and T be a collection of subsets of SS as T 
= { } { } { } { } { }{ }nn ττττττ ,...,,...,,,,..., 1211 . 
 
Note 3: Subtext SS will form a topological textual space SST ={SS,. T}  
 
Let 21 ,ττ be two points in SST. Points 21 ,ττ can be separated by neighborhoods since 
there is a neighborhood U of 1τ  and a neighborhood V of 2τ  such that ∅=VU ∩  
(Figure 2).  
 
SST
τ τ1 2
U V
 
Figure 2: Empty intersection of two neighborhoods U and V. 
 
S and SST are locally small categories and TSSS →:φ is a functor from S to SST. The 
functor φ  induces a function ( ) ( ) ( )( )2121 ,,:2,1 ssHomssHom SSSss φφφ →  for every pair 
of terms s1 and s2 in S. The functor φ  is faithful functor because 2,1 ssφ  is injective. 
Therefore TSSS →:φ  is a Top concrete category or belief constructed because at least 
one of its objects (SST) has topological structure and its morphisms are functions 
preserving this structure.  
Let SST’ be a subset of a topological space SST.  
 
Definition 11: Point τ is a point of closure of SST’ if every neighbourhood U of τ 
contains a point of SST’.  
 
Proposition 1: Structuring Structure SST is a Kolmogorov space T0. 
 
Proof: 
Two points 1τ  and 2τ  are topologically distinguishable because they have not exactly 
the same neighborhoods U and V; that is, at least one of them has a neighborhood that is 
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not a neighborhood of the other. If x and y are topologically distinguishable points, then 
the intersection of singlenton sets { }1τ and { }2τ must be disjoint{ } { } ∅=21 ττ ∩ . 
Topological indistinguishability of points is an equivalence relation ~. We define a 
topology on the quotient set SST/~ as follows: a set of equivalence classes in SST/~ is 
open iff their union is open in SST. This is the quotient topology on the quotient set 
SST/~. Let f : SST → SST/~ be the projection map which sends each element of SST to its 
equivalence class. Then the quotient topology on SST/~ is the finest topology for which f 
is continuous. The Kolmogorov quotient of SST  KQ(SST) under this equivalence 
relation ~ is always T0.  KQ(SST) and SST are homeomorphic.  
 
Proposition 2: The Structuring Structure SST is a symmetric space R0. 
 
Proof: 
Two points 1τ  and 2τ  are separated because each of them has a neighborhood U and V 
that is not a neighborhood of the other. The 1τ  and 2τ  are separated iff if their singleton 
sets { }1τ and { }2τ are separated.  
 
Proposition 3: The Structuring Structure SST is a Frechet space T1. 
 
Proof: 
SST is T1 because is both T0 and R0. 
 
Definition 12:  Point τ is an an accumulaion point iff every open neighbourhood U of τ 
contains a point of SST other than τ itself.  
 
Proposition 4: The Structuring Structure SST is a preregular space R1. 
 
Proof: 
1) The two points 1τ  and 2τ  are distinguishables. 
2) The two points 1τ  and 2τ  are separated by neighborhoods U and V. 
3) SST space is also be R0. 
 
Proposition 5: The Structuring Structure SST is a Hausdorff space T2.  
 
Proof: 
Thus, SST is Hausdorff because it is T0, R1 and T1. 
 
Let SST’ be a subspace of SST. 
 
Theorem 2:   SST’ is a Hausdorff space 
 
Proof: 
 
Let TSS ', 21 ∈ττ  where 21 ττ ≠ . Since SST is Hausdorff, there are disjoint 
neighborhoods U  of 1τ   and V of 2τ . Then TSSU '∩  is a neighborhood of 1τ   in SST’ 
and TSSV '∩  is a neighborhood of 2τ   in SST’ , and ( ) ( ) ∅='' TT SSVSSU ∩∩∩ . 
Therefore, SST’ is Hausdorff.  
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And SS∈∀τ , we have  
{ }


























Γ⊂∈∃⊆ΓΓ= UthatsuchUsetopenclosedSS ττ ,:∩  
 
Let U be a neighborhood of SST , let τ  a point in U and let ς  a point in U . There are 
disjoints between open neighborhoods V1 and V2.  
 
Theorem 3: 1VU ⊂  and 2V∈ς .  
 
Proof: 
∩ ∅=∃∈∀ τττττ 2121 ,,, VVVVU  such that ττ 1V∈  and τς 2V∈ . Then { } UV ∈ττ1  is an 
open structuring cover for U. There exists a finite set UU ⊂0  such that { } 01 UV ∈ττ  is a 
finite open structuring cover for U. Then ∪
0
11
U
VV
∈
=
τ
τ  and ∩
0
22
U
VV
∈
=
τ
τ . We suppose that 
1V∈∃υ . Then the following conditions are satisfied: 
a) V1 and V2 are open. 
b) 1VU ⊂  and 2V∈ς . 
c) For some ττ 10 , VzU ∈∈  
d) ∩ ∅=ττ 21 VV  
Then  τυ 2V∉  and 2V∉υ . 
 
Proposition 6: The Structuring Structure SST is a compact space. 
 
Proof: 
1) A compact space also be Hausdorff.  
2) Let { } IiiSC ∈ be an arbitrary collection of open subsets (structuring covers) of SST  
such that T
Ii
i SSSC ⊇
∈
∪  and there is a finite subset IJ ⊂  such that 
T
Jj
j SSSC ⊇
∈
∪ .Then, SST is a compact topological space.   
 
Let SST’ be a subset of SST. 
 
Theorem 4: The following statements are equivalent: 
a) SST’ is compact. 
b) Every open structuring cover of SST’ has a finite structuring subcover. 
 
Proof: 
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1) Suppose SST’ is compact, and { } IiiSC ∈  is an arbitrary open structuring cover of 
SST’, where SCi are open sets in SST. { } IiTi SSSC ∈'∩ is a collection of open sets 
in SST’ with union SST’. Since SST’ is compact, there is a finite subset 
IJ ⊂ such that ( ) ∪∪∪ ∩∩
Ji
iT
Ji
i
Ji
TiT SCSSSCSSSCSS
∈∈∈
⊂





== ''' so  { } JiiSC ∈  
is a finite open structuring cover of SST’. 
2) Suppose every open structuring cover of SST’ has a finite structuring subcover, 
and { } IiiSC ∈  is an arbitrary collection of open sets with union SST’. By 
definition of subspace topology, each SCi is of the form Tii SSUSC '∩=  for 
some open set Ui in SST. Now ii USC ⊂ , so { } IiiU ∈ is a structuring cover of SST’ 
by open sets in SST. By assumption, it has a finite structuring subcover { } JiiU ∈ . 
Then  { } JiiSC ∈  covers SST’, and SST’ is compact. 
 
5. STRUCTURES OF BELIEF MATERIALIZATION 
 
One first meaning of a belief net in the genesis of T, would mean the equality and 
unityconnecting the collective subject of T and the collective subject of the society or of 
a determined social group. This means that the social group’s WV would be the same 
that is materialized in T: the ways to remember, to suffer, to understand, to reason, etc., 
of a social group are such ways that are materialized in T. One first meaning of 
correlation would consist of finding the materialization of T, with a certain sublanguage 
Li, of its subjects, personages, situations, aesthetics, etc., corresponding to subjects, 
personages, situations, aesthetics, etc., of a certain social group. We cannot talk of a 
similarity, since the relations materialized in T do not correspond with exactitude more 
or less, with the one produced in the Structural Base (SB) of a determined social group.  
We propose in a first approach, three mathematical structures of materialization:  belief 
category, belief net and continuous materialization function. 
 
5.1. First Hypothesis: Belief Category 
The class concept is well known as a collection of sets or sometimes other mathematical 
objects which can be unambiguously defined by a property that all its members share. 
Every set is a class,no matter which foundation is chosen. A class that is a set is called a 
small class. If we have defined S as a direct set, therefore S is a small class.  
Let { }mSS τττ ,...,, 21=  be the Structuring Structure, { }msS ΤΤΤ= ,...,, 21  be the 
Structured Structure and { }msS ΓΓΓ= ,...,, 211  be other Structured Structure influenced 
by the first sS. Let bob(B) be a class formed by { }ωsSsSsSSSS ,...,,,, 1 . We may 
establish a morphism f between beliefs-objects of the class. Each morphism f has a 
unique source object s and target object τ  where s and τ are in bob(B). We write 
τ→sf :  and we write  ( )τ,hom s  to denote the hom-class of all morphisms from s to τ. 
For every three objects S, τ andΤ, There is a binary operation 
( ) ( ) ( )Τ→Τ ,hom,hom,hom sxs ττ called the composition of morphisms; the 
composition of τ→sf : and Τ→τ:'f  is written as ff ' .  
 
Therefore,  
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Definition 13: There is a belief category B consisting of a class bob(b) of belief objects, 
a class hom(B) of morphisms between the belief objects and a binary operation of 
composition of morphisms ff '  such that the following axioms hold: 
1) Associativity: If Τ→→ ττ :',: fsf and Γ→Τ:''f  then 
( ) ( ) ffffff  ''''' =   
2) Identity:  For every belief object b, there exists a morphism bbI b →:  called 
the identity morphism for b, such that for every morphism τ→sf : , we have 
sIfffI  ==τ  
 
Definition 14: Morphisms τ→sf : , Τ→τ:'f and Γ→Τ:''f are called function of 
connotation, function of materialization and function of influenced materialization 
respectively.  
 
We will graphically express it in figure 3.   
 
In the category of these sets, where morphisms are belief functions, two functions may 
be identical as sets of ordered pairs (may have the same range), while having different 
codomains. The two functions are distinct from the viewpoint of category theory.  
 
Let hom(B’) a subclass formed by the morphisms 
Γ→Τ:''f , 1:'' Γ→Τf ,…, ωΓ→Τ:''f . 
 
Definition 15: Subclass hom(B’) ⊂  hom(B) constitutes a textual style. 
 
Note 4: Morphisms Τ→τ:'f constitutes the process of initiation of a textual style.   
 
Example 2: In the middle of XII Century, in the monastic churches, as for example in 
both Cluny and Citaux, the gothic style prevailed. The Basilica Cathederal of Saint-
Denis near Paris is considered the first monumental masterpiece of Gothic art, and later 
the Cistercian churches that gradually propagated the gothic style across Europe.   
*** 
 
5.2. Second Hypothesis: The Belief Net 
We have defined S like a direct set. We have demonstrated previously (Usó-Domènech 
et al., 2009a,b; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012) that texts have a topological 
space structure.  Establishing a belief net between the SS of T and an ideology or belief 
system belonging to Doxical Superstructure (DS) will give one first approach to the 
identifying the significance of T (Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; 
Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2012a,.b). We are going to suppose a case limit:  
substantive beliefs of a belief system projects in a certain text. Let us take as a material 
example The Nicene Creed in theological medieval texts or we could take constructions 
like the roman or gothic cathedrals. In our theory, we will only work with substantive 
beliefs, but it can be extended to derived beliefs. In fact, thus it happens always.  Any 
text reflects not only substantive beliefs but all the set of derived beliefs Nescolarde-
Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2012c), many of them incorporated and accumulated during 
the period of existence of the belief system.   
 
16 
 
Definition 16: If SST is a textual topological space and S a directed set, a belief net in 
SST is a first materialization function φ from S to SST, .: TSSS →ϕ  
 
Note 5: We write a net from S to SST in the form ( )sτ , which expresses the fact that the 
term s in S is mapped to the subtext  sτ  in SST. 
 
Set of substantive beliefs 
 
S={s1,s2,...,sn}
Structurating
 
Structure 
 
SS={τ1,τ2,...,τn}
Structurated Structure 
 
sS={T1,T2,...,Tm}
f function of 
connotation
f'
  function of materialization
f'of funcion of connotative 
        naterialization
Structurated Structure 
sS1={Γ1,Γ2,...,Γm}
f''
function of influenced materialization
f''of
Figure 3: Functions of connotation, materialization and influenced materialization. 
 
 
Let Г be a subset of SS. Belief nets have the following properties: 
1) If ( )sτ  is  a belief net from S into SST, and if Г is a subset of SS, then we say that 
( )sτ  is residually in Г if jiij ssSsSs ≥∈∀∈∃ ,, , the point siτ s lies in Г. 
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2) If ( )sτ is  a belief net in SST, and τ  is an element of SST, we say that the belief 
net converges towards τ and write ττ =slim  iff for every neighborhood U ofτ , 
( )sτ  is eventually in U.  
 
Definition 17: The belief net φ is cofinally in Г if for every sj in S there exists 
some jii ssSs ≥∈ , , so that φ( is ) is in Г. 
 
Definition 18:  a belief net φ on SST is called a belief ultranet if for every subset Г of SS, 
either φ is eventually in Г or φ is eventually in SS- Г. 
 
Consequence 6: Belief nets will always be belief ultranets. 
 
Literary sacred texts, literary texts of political ideology, religious sanctuaries, etc, are 
examples of this class of belief ultranets.  
 
A belief net is the truly mediating thing, that is to say, the way to think.  A belief net 
puts in relation the WV of the collective subject with the SS of T. The idelogical net 
corresponds to a way to relate.   
Let ( )sτ  be a belief net on SST based on directed set S and τ  is a subtext of SS,  
 
For Proposition 6 SST is a compact space. Therefore every belief net ( )sτ  in SST has  a 
belief subnet with a limit in SST.  
 
5.3. Third Hypothesis: The continuous second materialization function 
Let B be a topological belief space ( )bclSB ,'=  such that SS ⊆' being S' subset of the 
set of substantive beliefs S. Let SST be a topological textual space ( )tclSST ,τ=  being τ 
a set of materialized substantive belief. SST is contained in B such that BSST ⊆ . That 
is, every element of SST is also an element of B. Then the topology SST is said to be a 
coarser belief topology than B, and B is said to be a finer belief topology than SST. 
Because TSSB ≠  we say SST is strictly coarser than B and B is strictly finer than SST. 
Let BBBB n ,,...,, 2!  be topological belief subspaces such that BBBB n ⊂⊂⊂⊂ ...21  
and BBBBSS nT ⊆⊆⊆⊆⊆ ...21 , The binary relation ⊆  defines a partial ordering 
relation on the set of all possible topologies. 
We suppose we have a function TSSBm →: .  
 
Definition 19: Function TSSBm →:  we call second materialization function.  
 
Definition 20: We say that the materialization function TSSBm →:  is a continuous 
second materialization function at s for some Bs ∈  if for any neighborhood V of m(s), 
there is a neighborhood U of s such that ( ) VUm ⊆ .  
 
We will graphically express it in figure 4.   
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B SST
U V
s.
. m(s)
m(U)
m
 
Figure 4: Materialization function TSSBm →:  
 
If m is continuous at every Bs ∈ , then we simply say m is continuous. 
 
The first of the hypotheses will allow us to establish a class different from 
materialization:  the mythical symbolic materialization. 
 
6. REFLECTIONS: ON BELIEF SYSTEMS, IDEOLOGIES AND MYTHS 
 
Culture is a symbolic system to be interpreted, understood, discussed, delineated, 
respected, and celebrated as the distinctive product of a particular group of people, of 
equal worth with all other such products. But it should never be used to explain 
anything about the people who produced it (Patterson, 2008). Not all cultural system 
building is compatible with sociological models for relationships between cultural and 
social forms. The semiotics of the linguistic disciplines can become so fixated on texts 
that references to an external and intersubjective – and potentially falsifiable – reality 
are weakened.  
A recurring theme of ideologies is that they are designed to unite and stimulate 
collective action. Their credibility is often closely tied to the traits of specific leaders or 
parties, which are perceived as representing specific groups or life forms that are 
distinctive from other leaders, groups and life forms. An ideology is often skewed 
toward an antagonistic relationship to conflicting ideologies. This implies that an 
ideology’s credibility depends on an overarching justification of its attempt to express 
what is irrational, good or just (Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; 
Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2012a,b). 
Social myths enter the picture at this point, and not only those with a clear political 
imprint. Nowadays, myths, from the Greek word mythos, are spread and interpreted in a 
variety of ways (Adams Perowne, 1990; Lévi-Strauss, Cl. 2001; Turner, 1968). By no 
means can it be taken for granted that the most important myths in contemporary 
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society are labelled and recognized as myths. As a rule, myths are perceived as 
concrete, often personified, accounts that provide us with dramatic pictures and 
explanations of the world order. Myths may be used to spread a religious message and 
to make the substance of politicized ideologies believable (Beaune, 1991). But myths 
are primarily tall tales, not ideological programs or religious beliefs. 
Myths are often reminiscent of the sagas. A saga usually tells the story of a specific 
historical character, e.g. a central figure in a heroic battle. As opposed to fairy tales, 
sagas purport to relate actual historic events. We should guard against a hasty 
dichotomizing of the antithetical terms mythos/logos. 
The question as to how true or false myths really are does not necessarily enter into an 
analytical delimitization of myths. If myths are automatically assumed to represent what 
is false – as is often the case – then an anti-myth can easily attain a status of being true 
because it is in opposition to the myth in question, which leads to an oversimplification. 
We expose a myth the same way that we expose an ideology – by using analytical 
criteria. As a working breakdown of myths, the following five hallmarks are typical for 
what are called myths: 
 
1)  Myths refer to familiar notions that purport to say something important about 
our lives. 
 
2) Myths give shape to a universal struggle by reducing it to a conflict between two 
forces. 
 
3) Myths incite our involvement by dramatizing these two forces as expressions of 
good and evil. There need not be equilibrium in the presentation of the two. As 
long as the one has been determined to be unequivocally good or bad, the other 
has thereby been defined. 
 
4) Myths are archetypal or repetitive in character. It is up to alert guardians to 
remind us of their presence in shifting guises in ever changing situations. People 
can be taught to recognize the mythical drama in a given situation through 
specific codes or symbols. 
 
5) Myths are usually geared more toward mobilizing the individual mind than 
toward inciting collective political action. They can be directed toward the 
cultural sphere rather than the political arena. 
 
In light of the above, an approach to systems of belief will only be able to capture 
certain aspects of the collective faith that religion typifies. Without trying to list all the 
reasons why we can expect to find religion as a hallmark of human cultures, we will 
mention two of them. 
One of these has to do with people’s need to feel a sense of security. From an 
emotional, ethical and even cognitive standpoint, people depend on mutual structure and 
on certainty. Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote at length about how certainty presupposes 
trust, without our being able – strictly speaking – to prove what we take for granted. 
(Wittgenstein, 1962). But for such a perception of reality to be meaningful and 
functional, there must first be a cultural institutionalization based on premises other than 
the strictly rationalistic. By extending this type of reasoning, we can claim that no 
unified perception of reality can be established apart from hypothetical premises, which 
in a certain sense contain an element of faith. Strictly speaking, the existence or non-
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existence of God can no more be proved or disproved than historic determinism or 
indeterminism. 
Dissimilar cultures are constructed around different but specific answers to these 
questions. Christian culture has maintained the existence of both a divine order and an 
individual accountability – that is, indeterminism in an essential field of reality. Islamic 
culture, by and large, has regarded the social sector as being determined by Allah's will. 
Buddhist culture has basically perceived reality as being determined by major 
repetitions, but without a personal God being behind the determinism. Humanists have 
usually taken a non-deistic view of reality, in which natural explanations are perceived 
as an adjustment to deterministic laws, while human values and individual freedom 
have been linked to an extreme emphasis on indeterminism. 
The sociologist and moral philosopher Zygmunt Bauman (1992) has given an account 
of different cultures in relation to their choice of “life strategy” with respect to death 
and a consciousness of the risk of death. The religious response has consisted 
identifying true life with the soul and immortality. What he calls “the modern strategy” 
has consisted of identifying with social groups and politico-cultural movements and 
fighting for their supraindividual survival. Furthermore, it consisted of an attempt to 
deconstruct the insolubility of death into specific problems that can be resolved at the 
individual level, such as health and accident insurance. Different life strategies 
predispose people to a predilection for widely different institutions and orientations. A 
“meaningful life” usually means one with purpose, a life where sorrows are 
counterbalanced by pleasures, a life where the overall goal gives direction to minor 
goals and purpose to major sacrifices. When people write and speak at length about a 
“cry for meaning,” they are thinking about something more than finding explanations 
for what is happening in people’s surroundings and for the need to have order in their 
daily lives (Frankl, 1978). In this context, “meaning” denotes something qualitatively 
important, something not necessarily found through mundane social interaction. 
Even though the acquisition and development of meaning have important personal 
aspects, no civilization can relegate meaning to the status of a strictly private matter, 
with important social tasks reduced to supplying the necessities of life and maintaining 
a modicum of law and order. Communicative social bonds presuppose a common 
culture, in the sense of common frameworks of meaning. Without these frameworks, 
society's social bonds would ultimately disintegrate. From such a viewpoint, 
development and the maintenance of an adequate framework of meaning is imperative 
to ensure long-term viability of any society. Deductively, this can lead to the conclusion 
that in all cultures we can expect to find, not only a collective faith in axiomatic values, 
but an institutionalized religion as well. This jibes with Berelson and Steiner’s (1964) 
empirical inventory, that “all societies have religion(s).” 
In cases where the socially supported religion is not transcendental in nature, we can 
expect political ideas to have a religious hue. This applies not just to ideologies in 
totalitarian societies. Even a belief in liberal humanity can assume religious forms. We 
will return later to the subject of the cult of human rights in our kind of society.  
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